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Abstract 
 
Banking industry liberalization in China has gained pace. The theoretical underpinning of 
this policy approach is the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, which contends that a liberalized 
financial sector will maximize the quantity of deposits mobilized and optimize the 
efficiency with which these funds are allocated amongst competing investments. 
However, disparate country experiences with the process of financial liberalization have 
prompted the emergence of alternative theoretical paradigms. One theory that has been 
proposed argues that through reducing bank franchise values, liberalization may have the 
effect of reducing the quantity of deposits mobilized. Drawing on an extensive 
international panel data set, the empirical analysis conducted in this paper suggests that, 
contrary to this hypothesis, bank franchise values are either unrelated, or negatively 
related, to deposits mobilization. Nevertheless, the process of banking industry 
liberalization still poses immense challenges for policy-makers in China, and the extent 
to which these challenges are adequately met will go a long way to determining whether 
the transition to a market economy is successfully completed.  
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1. Introduction and theoretical background 
Banking industry reform in China has gained pace. The most prominent aspect to date 
has been a loosening of market entry restrictions. Competition for the incumbent big four 
state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) initially came from other domestic financial 
institutions. The 1990s saw the creation of numerous joint-stock commercial banks 
(JSCBs) such as the China Minsheng Banking Group in 1996, China’s first privately 
owned commercial bank. Former urban credit cooperatives were encouraged to 
amalgamate and form city commercial banks (CCBs) to provide greater competition for 
the SOCBs in urban areas. More recently, competition has also started to come from 
foreign sources. While many foreign commercial banks have had a presence in China that 
dates back to the early years of the reform period, they have almost exclusively been 
restricted to providing foreign currency services to foreign entities (individuals, 
companies, embassies, etc). WTO entry in 2001 promised to radically change this 
scenario. As part of its entry concessions, China agreed to a five-year phase-in period that 
would see foreign banks being afforded full national treatment by 2006. Thus, foreign 
banks are currently in the midst of gaining access to China’s 1.3 billion people, 
RMB1200 billion local-currency savings market (The Banker, 03/11/2003). Although the 
SOCBs remain dominant, the introduction of domestic and foreign sources of 
competition has produced significant changes in the structure of China’s banking 
industry. Table 1 shows that their market share has declined from almost monopoly levels 
to below 75% in 2003.  
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Table 1. The structure of China’s commercial banking industry 2003 
 Number Assets (RMB billion) Share (%) 
SOCBs 4 15190 72.8 
JSCBs 11 3817 18.3 
CCBs 112 1462 7.0 
FCBs1 ≈ 200 397 1.9 
Notes –  
1. The situation with respect to foreign banks is highly dynamic. At end-June 2004, foreign banks had 
established 200 operating entities in 13 cities in China. A total of 100 of these had received permission to 
conduct business in RMB, although 47 of these can only provide RMB services to foreign-invested 
companies. The RMB assets of foreign banks in China at this time were RMB84.4 billion.  
2. China’s banking sector also consists of three banks whose job it is to undertake policy lending mandated 
by the government. Although these banks hold considerable assets, they are not included in Table 1 as they 
are not commercial banks operating in competition with the others banks listed. For data regarding China’s 
banking sector, including the policy banks, the interested reader may like to consult the website of the 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/english/) 
Sources – 
1. People’s Daily (10 / 03 / 2004) 
2. People’s Daily (10 / 02 / 2004) 
3. China Daily (20 / 07 / 2004) 
 
Aside from relaxing market entry constraints, the deregulation of interest rates has also 
received increasingly prominent attention in official media reports. According to the 
People’s Daily (03/03/2003), the People’s Bank of China “…has made the advancement 
of liberalized interest rates its priority for 2003”. The China Daily (11/12/2003) reports 
that from 2004, commercial banks will have the freedom to charge lending rates 1.7 times 
the benchmark rate set by the central bank. Interest rates on foreign currency lending 
have already been liberalized. 
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The theoretical underpinning of greater liberalization in the banking industry is the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis3. The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis contends that 
government interventions in the banking sector, such as restricting market entry and 
regulating interest rates at below their equilibrium levels, damages economic 
development by reducing the incentive that economic agents have to hold financial assets 
and by creating the need for an inefficient administrative credit rationing process. A 
liberalized banking sector on the other hand will see banks competing with one another 
for deposits, putting upward pressure on the deposit rate of interest and thus increasing 
the quantity of deposits mobilized. By allowing the market to allocate credit, it is also 
claimed that loans will then be directed toward those investments that offer the highest 
risk-adjusted rates of return.   
 
However, a point of concern emerges in that the empirical evidence supporting the key 
claims of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is far from overwhelming. For example, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) find using an international panel data set that the 
interest rate rises resulting from increased competition amongst banks for deposits are 
linked to periods of financial crises. The current consensus in the literature is that 
financial liberalization will only promote economic development if numerous 
prerequisite conditions have first been satisfied (Fry, 1997). These include the presence 
of a well-developed prudential framework to regulate and monitor banking firms. Such 
conditions are rarely met in a developing country context.  
 
                                                 
3 It could also be said that moves to greater competition are underpinned by the structure-conduct-
performance (S-C-P) paradigm. Either way, the policy implications of both hypotheses are the same. For a 
review of the banking literature from a S-C-P perspective, see Berger, et al. (2004).  
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Disparate country experiences with the process of financial liberalization have also 
prompted the emergence of alternative theoretical paradigms. One recent contribution, 
Hellman, et al. (2000), hypothesizes that banking industry liberalization can increase 
financial fragility and reduce deposit mobilization by eroding the franchise values 
associated with owning a banking firm. The logic underlying the proposed link between 
liberalization and fragility is relatively simple:  
 
“Financial liberalization increases competition; competition erodes profits; lower profits 
imply lower franchise values (i.e., the capitalized value of expected future profits); and 
lower franchise values lower incentives for making good loans, increasing the moral 
hazard problem. With sufficient competition banks will find it desirable to gamble”. 
(p.148) 
 
 
According to this view franchise value can be considered as part of the bank’s own 
capital.  Just as tangible capital can moderate risk-taking, it is argued that franchise value 
can have the same effect. Since franchise value is the discounted future profits accruing 
to the bank, it is only by lending prudently and staying in operation over the long term 
that these rents can be captured. Competition that erodes franchise value is therefore akin 
to a reduction in capital adequacy, with expected implications for risk-taking behavior. In 
addition, the above authors propose that one of the likely consequences of increased 
financial fragility is that confidence in the banking system will fall and this will adversely 
affect the quantity of savings deposits that the public is willing to hold. They also 
advance the claim that an erosion of bank franchise values will lower the incentives that 
banks have to invest in deposits mobilization infrastructure such as an extensive branch 
network. If banking industry liberalization does have a negative impact on deposits 
mobilization, this has important implications for economic development given that a 
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robust relationship has been observed between measures of financial depth and economic 
growth (Levine, 1997).  
 
The policy implications that flow from this alternative theoretical paradigm are vastly 
different to those associated with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. Hellman, et al. (2000) 
argues that interest rate liberalization is incompatible with an efficient outcome and 
instead advocates regulating the deposit rate of interest. To the extent that such 
government policies work to preserve bank franchise values, it is claimed that they 
promote financial stability and deposits mobilization. In an earlier paper, Hellman, et al. 
(1997) draws on the stylized facts of East Asian economic development to provide 
anecdotal-type evidence in support of this hypothesis. Many of the countries in this 
region experienced rapid rates of financial deepening and economic growth while at the 
same time maintaining highly regulated banking sectors. In a similar vein, the more 
recent paper highlights the events of the Asian financial crisis, which occurred only after 
many of these same countries had undertaken substantial banking industry liberalization.  
 
The aim of this paper is to move beyond anecdotal evidence and more rigorously 
examine the link between bank franchise values and deposits mobilization. Section two 
of this paper discusses methodological issues associated with the testing of this 
relationship and presents and discusses the results of the empirical models estimated. 
Section three summarises the paper and concludes by remarking on some of the 
challenges that the process of banking industry liberalization poses for policy-makers in 
China.  
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2. Methodology, data and results 
Traditionally, studies that seek to model a measure of financial depth specify it to be a 
function of real GDP per capita and a measure of the incentive that economic agents have 
to hold financial assets, such as the real deposit rate of interest or the rate of inflation. 
Subsequent studies have also sought to allow for the possibility that deposit mobilization 
may occur through channels other than the real interest rate (Demetriades and Luintel, 
1996a,b, 1997, 2001; Arestis, et al. 2002).  Such channels could include those mentioned 
earlier. For example, government regulation of interest rates that enhance bank franchise 
values could potentially, via a confidence effect, promote an increased willingness on the 
part of the public to hold savings deposits at each level of the real interest rate. Likewise, 
regulations that enhance bank franchise values could act as an incentive for banks to 
invest in deposits mobilization infrastructure. This could lead to an increase in savings 
deposits by reducing the transaction costs that members of the public incur when using 
the formal banking system.  
 
To the author’s knowledge, no study has emerged that explicitly tests the impacts that 
bank franchise values have on deposits mobilization. While two of the most recent 
studies, Demetriades and Luintel (2001) and Arestis, et al. (2002), cite the theoretical 
proposal of Hellman, et al. (2000) in their review of literature, the empirical models these 
papers estimate specify that a measure of financial depth is a function of real GDP per 
capita, the real deposit rate of interest and an index value that is constructed using 
dummy variables indicating the presence or absence of government interventions such as 
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interest rate controls. The limitation of this approach is that the presence of such 
interventions does not necessarily mean that they augment bank franchise values. The 
Chinese case provides a useful illustration of this point. Government regulated interest 
rates in this country have meant that the interest rate spread faced by banking firms has 
often been less than in liberalized and highly competitive banking markets. In 1994, for a 
time the one-year time deposit rate of interest was actually equal to the one-year working 
capital loan rate (Laurenceson and Chai, 2003).  
 
In this paper, the empirical model estimated is of the form –  
 
itititititiit BANKDEPINTMARINFGDPCAPBANKDEP εβββα +++++= −13210  
 
where itBANKDEP  is the ratio of demand, time and savings deposits in deposit money 
banks to GDP, and where the subscripts i and t refer to country i and time period t. 
GDPCAP is the logarithm of GDP per capita, measured in constant 1995 $US. INF is the 
rate of inflation as measured by the GDP deflator. INTMAR is the average net interest 
margin received by banks in a given country. The net interest margin is calculated as the 
accounting value of a bank’s net interest revenue as a share of its interest bearing assets.  
 
Before estimation, several features of the above model should be discussed and 
differences with earlier models highlighted. It can be seen from the subscripts that the 
regression is estimated using panel data. Aside from maximizing the number of 
observations available for econometric estimation, the rationale for using panel data is 
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that it allows for the heterogeneities that have been observed across countries in the 
relationship between financial liberalization and financial depth to be taken into account. 
These heterogeneities reflect, amongst other factors, differing institutional environments. 
The panel data set includes 101 countries at various stages of development over the 
period 1994-2001 (Table 2). In most cases a complete data series was available for each 
country. In contrast, the study by Demetriades and Luintel (2001) only considered time 
series data relating to Korea and the paper by Arestis, et al (2002) considered six 
countries using time series data on each. A panel data model with fixed effects was 
decided upon in preference to one with random effects because the countries included in 
the sample were determined by whether sufficient data was available and therefore 
cannot be considered as random drawings from a census-type data set. The model is first 
estimated allowing for fixed effects across countries but not through time. For sensitivity 
purposes the model is then re-estimated allowing for fixed effects also through time. 
 
Table 2. Countries included in the panel data set 
High income countries Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus,  
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong 
Kong SAR, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
Kuwait, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,  United 
States 
Upper-middle income countries Argentina, Barbados, Botswana, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Croatia, Czech Repubilic, Estonia, Hungry, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Oman, 
Panama, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Lower-middle income countries Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, 
Columbia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, 
Jamaica, Jordon, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Namibia, 
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Peru, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, 
South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine,  
Low income countries Bangladesh, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, India, Kenya, 
Malawi, Mali, Moldova, Mozambique, Nepal, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone,  Vietnam, Zimbabwe  
 
 
In terms of specification, the major difference between the above model and those that 
have been estimated previously is that it seeks to directly incorporate bank franchise 
values through the inclusion of net interest margins received by banks. If a government 
restricts market entry and / or regulates interest rates in such a way as to enhance bank 
franchise values then presumably this should be reflected in higher net interest margins. 
While no single perfect estimator of bank franchise values exists (see Demirgüç-Kunt, et 
al., 2004), the model estimated here is far better connected to the theoretical model 
proposed by Hellman, et al. (2000) than earlier research. Two other specification issues 
should be noted. Firstly, the model is autoregressive in nature. The theoretical rationale 
for including a lagged value of the dependent variable as an additional regressor is that 
the current volume of deposits is likely to be influenced by the volume in the previous 
period through the deposits multiplier. Secondly, the rate of inflation is used in 
preference to the real interest rate. The reason for this is that the real interest rate is a 
notoriously difficult to empirically estimate because it reflects the difference between the 
nominal interest rate and the expected rate of inflation. Apart from requiring the 
researcher to specify a representative nominal interest rate, the treatment of inflationary 
expectations is typically awkward and unsatisfactory. Some studies include ex post 
measures of the real interest rate despite it clearly being an ex ante concept. As has been 
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noted by the German central bank, “Although ex post real interest rates are interesting as 
an indicator of the historical interest charged or paid to the economic agents, they are of 
no direct relevance to their saving and investment decisions” (Deutsche Bundesbank 
Monthly Report July 2001). Others have used the current rate of inflation to proxy for 
expected inflation. In doing so rigid assumptions are made regarding how inflationary 
expectations are formed and ones that break down when inflation is either accelerating or 
decelerating. Yet other studies have attempted to estimate inflationary expectations by 
taking the difference between nominal and inflation-indexed treasury bonds (Sack, 2000). 
While this approach is probably the most defensible, such data is usually not available for 
developing countries and it are these countries that are most commonly making the 
transition to a more liberalized banking system. Aside from problems associated with 
attempting to estimate inflationary expectations, directly including the rate of inflation 
can be justified in other ways. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) contend that the real 
interest rate only impacts on other economic variables when it becomes substantially 
negative. If real interest rates are substantially negative, this is generally indicative of 
high rates of inflation rather than low nominal interest rates. World Bank (1993) also 
showed in the context of the high-growth Asian economies that once the rate of inflation 
is included in a regression equation seeking to model financial depth, any apparent 
statistical significance associated with the real interest rate disappears.   
 
A priori it is expected that GDPCAP and 1−tBANKDEP  should exhibit a positive 
relationship with BANKDEP.  INF on the other hand should display a negative 
relationship. The sign of INTMAR is not known a priori. If the Hellman, et al. (2000) 
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hypothesis is correct in predicting an increase in bank franchise values will promote 
deposits mobilization, the coefficient should be positive. The data for BANKDEP is 
sourced from a database provided by the World Bank and discussed in Beck, et al. 
(2000). Data for GDPCAP and INF come from the World Bank’s publication, World 
Development Indicators. INTMAR comes from the same database as BANKDEP. This 
database in turn sources the data from Fitch’s Bankscope database, which collects data on 
more than 11,000 banks worldwide.   
 
The results associated with the models described above are as follows. 
 
Table 3. Results 
Variable Country fixed 
effects only 
Country and 
time period 
fixed effects 
Country fixed 
effects with 
White-type 
cross-section 
standard errors 
Country fixed 
effects with 
White-type 
time period 
standard errors 
α  -0.136109*** 
(0.031183) 
-0.125562*** 
(0.034845) 
-0.136109** 
(0.054309) 
-0.136109** 
(0.055171) 
GDPCAP 2.20E-05*** 
(3.86E-06) 
2.11E-05*** 
(4.27E-06) 
2.20E-05** 
(9.08E-06) 
2.20E-05** 
(7.97E-06) 
INF -0.000141* 
(7.28E-05) 
-0.000127* 
(7.34E-05) 
-0.000141*** 
(2.98E-05) 
-0.000141*** 
(3.08E-05) 
INTMAR -0.149198 
(0.208418) 
-0.186605 
(0.210063) 
-0.149198** 
(0.061619) 
-0.149198 
(0.117914) 
BANKDEPt-1 0.941630*** 
(0.019931) 
0.940520*** 
(0.020130) 
0.941630*** 
(0.056278) 
0.941630*** 
(0.061689) 
 2R = 0.980822 
F-statistic = 
323.5937*** 
D-W statistic = 
1.740 
2R = 0.980819 
F-statistic = 
305.9564*** 
D-W statistic = 
1.725 
  
Notes – 
1. Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
2. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the ten, five and one percent level respectively.  
 
 12
 
The 2R and F-test values show that the estimated models perform well in terms of overall 
significance and goodness of fit. Another healthy sign is that the signs associated with the 
coefficients of the individual regressors are in accordance with a priori expectations. 
There are no statistically significant differences between the model that includes country-
only fixed effects and the one that also allows for time period fixed effects.  The 
coefficient to GDPCAP is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. 
The coefficient to INF is negative and significant at the ten percent level (and is 
borderline significant at the five percent level). The coefficient to BANKDEPt-1 is positive 
and significant at the one percent level. The coefficient to INTMAR is negative and not 
statistically significant. The Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistic of 1.74 appears to indicate 
the models do not suffer from autocorrelation however the inclusion of an autoregressive 
term renders the standard Durbin-Watson statistic unreliable (Gudgerati, 2003). A more 
appropriate test is Durbin’s H statistic, which was calculated and found to be 3.88. This 
value is high and points to the presence of positive autocorrelation. As a result, the model 
with country only fixed effects was run again using White-type standard errors that are 
robust in the presence of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The major change is that 
the coefficient to INF becomes statistically significant at the one percent level. The 
probability of accepting the null hypothesis that the coefficient to INTMAR is equal to 
zero also falls. In the case of the model using White-type cross-section standard errors, 
the null hypothesis is rejected at the five percent level and thus points to a statistically 
significant and negative relationship between bank franchise values and deposits 
moblilization. When using White-type time period standard errors, the coefficient 
remains statistically insignificant although less so than when unadjusted standard errors 
 13
were used. In summary, the results of not supportive of the view that there is a positive 
relationship between bank franchise values and deposits mobilization. If anything, they 
suggest the relationship could in fact be negative.  
 
3. Conclusion 
China’s banking industry is moving towards greater levels of competition and 
deregulation. Such policies reflect theoretical perspectives encapsulated in the 
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis that financial liberalization will promote both the quantity of 
deposits mobilized and the efficiency with which these funds are allocated amongst 
competing investments. A point of concern however is that the disappointing experience 
many countries have had with financial liberalization has meant that the theoretical 
insights of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis and the associated policy implications are 
equivocal. These experiences have also prompted the emergence of alternative theoretical 
paradigms. This paper considered one point over which there is current theoretical debate 
– the relationship between liberalization and deposits mobilization. Hellman, et al. (2000) 
proposed that by reducing bank franchise values, liberalization could act to reduce the 
quantity of deposits mobilized. Empirically investigating this hypothesis is important 
because a robust relationship has been observed between measures of financial depth and 
economic growth. This paper drew on panel data covering 101 countries over the period 
1994-2001 to examine the relationship between bank franchise values and deposits 
mobilization. The results provided little support for the view that lower bank franchise 
values are associated with reduced deposits mobilization. In fact, there was a stronger 
suggestion that the relationship between these two variables is negative. Explaining this 
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empirical observation is largely left for future theoretical work.  One possible explanation 
is that increased competition results in service quality improvements that may act to 
provide the public with an incentive to raise their holdings of savings deposits at each 
level of the real interest rate.  
 
For countries such as China, these results should not be taken as evidence that moves 
toward financial liberalization should be expedited. While increased liberalization may 
not reduce the overall quantity of deposits mobilized, it is likely to affect the respective 
institutional holdings of these deposits. In China’s case, this potentially could lead to a 
destabilizing liquidity crunch in the state banking system. Since the early 1990s the 
SOCBs have been technically insolvent in the sense of having non-performing loans in 
excess of their own capital (Lardy, 1998). In spite of this, they have been able to remain 
liquid because of the continued build up of savings deposits by the household sector. If in 
the future households increasingly placed their savings deposits in FCBs, for example, 
the precarious viability of the SOCBs could be exposed. Bonin and Huang (2002) have 
sought to shed light on this possibility by analyzing the experience of foreign bank entry 
into the transitional economies of Central Europe. They find that even after one decade, 
foreign banks in these economies only hold a small share of the household savings 
deposits market. This is largely due to the fact that new entrants suffer a competitive 
disadvantage vis-à-vis the incumbent banks in not having an established branch network. 
This situation can also be observed in China where the most prominent foreign bank, 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), only has a network consisting 
of nine branches. This is in stark contrast to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
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China, the largest SOCB, which has 8800 branches (The Banker, 03/11/2003). Thus, at 
least into the foreseeable future, the risk of a competition-induced liquidity crunch in the 
SOCBs is limited. 
 
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the evidence presented in this paper does not 
repudiate what may be considered the more important aspect of the hypothesis proposed 
by Hellman, et al. (2000) - that declining bank franchise values worsen the incentives that 
banks have to engage in excessively risky behavior and so promote financial instability.  
As noted in the Introduction, evidence linking period of financial liberalization to 
financial fragility suggest this possibility needs to be taken very seriously. Increased risk-
taking behavior by banks can expectedly be complicated by the response of some firms to 
higher interest rates caused by banks competing for deposits.  Fry (1997) contends that 
the reason many country experiences with financial liberalization have failed is because 
of the perverse reaction to higher interest rates by insolvent and / or non-profit motivated 
firms.  By definition, an insolvent firm is unable to repay its existing loans and hence is 
not deterred by a higher borrowing cost. It simply continues, if it can, to borrow whatever 
it needs to finances its losses. Such firms bid up the interest rate until normally solvent, 
profit-motivated firms cannot access credit or become insolvent due to the high cost of 
borrowing. This moral hazard dilemma is amplified in transitional countries such as 
China in which the budget constraints of the major lenders, the SOCBs, and the major 
borrowers, the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), remain soft. Mehran, et al (1996) note 
that as long as an SOE cannot go bankrupt it will be more concerned with the availability 
of credit rather than its price. Laurenceson and Chai (2001) add that the SOCBs need not 
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concern themselves with the full risk associated with lending to SOEs because the 
government is the effective guarantor of these loans. Thus, the banking industry 
liberalization measures mandated in China’s WTO agreement pose immense and 
immediate challenges for policy-makers in China. It is no exaggeration to suggest that the 
extent to which policy-makers can implement the prerequisite conditions that are 
necessary for a liberalized banking sector to positively impact on economic development 
will go a long way to determining whether China can successfully complete the transition 
to a market economy.   
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